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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH K. BRADFORD and 
TAM.MY BRADFORD, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
vs. 
MICHAEL ALVEY and 
VAUGHN ALVEY, d/b/a 
C. HOWARD ALVEY & SONS, 
a Partnership; and 
MICHAELE. CROWLEY, a 
General Partner, d/b/a 
MICRO INVESTMENT, a Utah 
Limited Partnership, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
Case No. 16829 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLAN'I'S' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth Bradford, 
seek specific performance, or in the alternative, damages 
for breach of an agreement in the form of an Earnest Money 
Receipt And Offer To Purchase (Exhibit 1). 
DISPOSI'i"ION IN 1l'HE LOWER COURT 
The court below held that a condition precedent to the 
subject agreement becoming binding never occurred. The court 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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found that Mr. and Mrs. Bradford "failed to reasonably pursue 
the financing," and thus found for the Defendants-Respondents, 
"no cause of action." (R. 172 I 225-232) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mr. and Mrs. Bradford, Appellants, seek to have the 
judgment for Defendants-Respondents reversed and remanded for 
a determination of costs and attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. and Mrs. Bradford have been married for nearly 
four years. They have three children. Mr. Bradford has been 
a letter carrier for the U. S. Postal Service for about the 
last four and one-half years. (R. 369) 
In February of 1978, they were in the market for a 
new home for their expanding family. They drove through the 
Shiloh subdivision in West Jordan, Utah. Interested in pur-
chasing in that area, they took down a name and telephone 
number from a sign that was posted in the subdivision. {R. 372) 
The sign indicated that Midvalley Investment was market-
ing the subdivision. Mr. Bradford called the number and 
talked with Michael Herzog, real estate agent for Midvalley. 
Mr. Herzog visited Mr. and Mrs. Bradford in their home, at 
which time he prepared and they signed the Earnest Money 
Receipt, Exhibit "l," to purchase Lot 95 Shiloh Subdivision, 
West Jordan, Utah. (R. 3 7 2) 
-2-
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This was on or about February 17, 1978. The Earnest 
Money was accepted by Respondents Michael and Vaughn Alvey 
for Midvalley on or about February 22, 1978. The agreement 
was expressly made "sale subject to buyer obtaining financing 
(FHA)." (Exhibit 1). Said Respondents, Alveys, never had 
any direct contact with either Mr. and Mrs. Bradford. 
(R. 404, 415, 493, 495) 
During all times pertinent hereto, Midvalley Invest-
ment's offices were located in th~ same building as the 
offices of Respondencts-Alveys. (R. 382, 383) Also, Respon-
dents Michael Alvey and Vaughn Alvey were the vice president/ 
treasurer and president/secretary, respectively, of Midvalley. 
(R. 374 I 450) 
A few days after the Earnest Money Receipt, Exhibit "l" 
was signed, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford were taken by Mr. Herzog 
to American Home Mortgage. The reason for the meeting was to 
obtain a "pre-qualification" for a loan conunitment. (R. 375) 
Mr. Herzog told Mr. and Mrs. Bradford to pursue the loan to 
the extent of keeping American Home Mortgage aware of their 
continued interest. (R. 278, 279, 413, 414) 
[As preferred by the subsequent affidavits of Michael 
Herzog and Mr. Bradford, and as set forth in the deposition 
of Mr. Bradford, Mr. Bradford was told he could not get a 
loan conunitment until the home was nearly completed: 
(R. 194-199 I 281, 282) (Note: This testimony was disallowed 
-3-
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at trial on the ground of hearsay. That this was prejudicial 
error will be set forth below.)] 
Barney Alvey is the brother of the Respondents Alveys. 
He was the general foreman for these Respondents in the con-
struction of the subject home. (R. 376, 450, 451) 
About a week· after Mr. and Mrs. Bradford had their 
"pre-qualification" at Arnerican Home Mortgage, they met with 
Barney Alvey and Michael Herzog in Midvalley Investment's 
office. The house plans were reviewed, and the Bradfords 
were given Barney Alvey's home telephone number. Mr. and 
Mrs. Bradford were told to call Barney Alvey with respect to 
any problems they might have with respect to the home. 
(R. 376-378, 437) At this time, Barney Alvey told the 
Bradfords that the home would be completed sometime in July 
or August of 1978. Bradfords were also given a list of sup-
pliers from whom they could pick out materials for the home. 
(R. 383) 
Pam Tazzer was also employed by Respondents Alveys 
and worked in the offices of C. Howard Alvey & Sons. (R. 383, 
451) In late February, 1978, Mrs. Bradford discussed with 
Ms. Tazzer over the telephone their choice of brick for the 
subject house. (R. 438) In early March, 1978, Mr. and Mrs 
Bradford met with Ms. Tazzer in the offices of Respondents 
Alveys to choose their tile, tile colors and appliance 
colors. (R. 383, 384, 438) 
-4-
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In May, 1978, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford met with Barnev 
Alvey at the home site. Discussions were had at that time 
regarding the problems Respondents Alveys were having in 
getting the brick for the home (R. 384) 
In the latter part of July, 1978, Mr. Bradford tele-
phoned Barney Alvey at his home. Construction of the house 
was discussed including the fact that there was still a 
problem in obtaining brick. (R. 384) 
In September, 1978, Mr. Bradford again telephoned 
Barney Alvey at his home and asked why the home was not being 
worked on and why there was no brick. Barney Alvey stated 
that there were continuing problems with Interstate Brick 
Company in obtaining the brick for the home. (R. 385, 386) 
Mrs. Bradford also made repeated telephone calls to 
Ms. Tazzer in March, April, May, and July of 1978. These 
were primarily for the purpose of choosing the brick, shingles, 
appliances, and other such items for the house. 
In July, Ms. Tazzer indicated to Mrs. Bradford that 
there was still a problem getting brick, and that it would 
not be available until September, 1978. ( R. 4 3 9 , 4 4 0) In 
September, 1978, Mrs. Bradford again discussed with Barney 
Alvey the delay caused by the problem in getting the brick 
from Interstate. (R. 440) In November, 1978, Mrs. Bradford 
met with Ms. Tazzer in the offices of Respondents Alveys and 
picked out the stone work for the house. (R. 440) 
-5-
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In October, 1978, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford sold a duplex 
they owned and had been living in since prior to the execu-
tion of the subject Earnest Honey Receipt And Offer To 
Purchase, Exhibit "l." 
In anticipation of obtaining the money needed to get 
into their new house, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford had advertised 
the duplex for sale. They received an offer which they con-
sidered to be very good and, therefore, accepted. At this 
time, they realized it would still be a substantial time 
before the Shiloh house was finished. Not wanting to lose 
money paying rent, they chose to purchase another home located 
at 902 Potomac, Salt Lake City, Utah. This was also in 
October, 1978. (R, 386, 387) 
In the first part of December, 1978, the Bradfords 
were contacted by Respondents Alveys' office and told where 
to pick out their cabinets. Pursuant to this telephone call, 
the Bradfords chose their cabinets and paid $52.00 above the 
standard allowance. (R. 392, Exhibit 8) About one week 
later, December 12, 1978, the Bradfords paid $157.00 for 
extra counter-top material used in the Shiloh home. 
(R. 392, 417, Exhibit 9) 
In January, 1979, Mrs. Bradford called Barney Alvey 
and asked him when the house would be ready as they would need 
to sell their existing home. (R. 441) Barney Alvey told her 
that the house would be ready in two months, and they should 
get their existing house sold. (R. 441) 
-6-
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Sometime in the first week of February, 1979, Mr. 
Bradford called Barney Alvey and asked why the house was not 
being worked on. Barney Alvey told him they (Alveys) were 
finishing another house, but the Bradfords' house was next 
on line to be finished. (R. 386) 
About a month later, early March, 1979, Mr. Bradford 
again called Barney Alvey and told him they (Bradfords) had 
sold their Murray home and would have to move within 30 days. 
Barney Alvey told him the Shiloh house could probably be 
finished within 30 days (R. 386) 
Shortly after this, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford made a formal 
application to Mason-McDuffie for an FHA loan. This was 
on or about March 12, 1979. (R. 345, 388) No loan com-
mitment was given on this loan application because the lending 
institution did not believe the home was substantially enough 
completed to order and process the needed FHA appraisal. 
(R. 345) 
About the first of April, 1979, and prior to the 
completion of the loan application described above, Mrs. 
Bradford called Respondents Alveys' offices and asked for Ms. 
Tazzer. Respondent Michael Alvey, however, got on the tele-
phone and told Mrs. Bradford that they had sold the Bradford's 
contract to Respondent Crowley. Mr. Alvey gave Mrs. Bradford 
Crowley's telephone number. Nothing was said indicating Res-
pondents were going to dishonor the contract, Exhibit 1. 
(R. 442) 
-7-
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After Mrs. Bradford's conversation with Respondent 
Michael Alvey, Mr. Bradford telephoned Respondent Crowley. 
Mr. Bradford asked about the Shiloh property. Although Mr. 
Bradford expressed a continued interest in purchasing the 
house, Mr. Crowley stated he could not sell it to them for 
the original contract price of $54,900.00, but would sell 
it to them for $62,000.00. (R. 394, 418, 407, Exhibit 1) 
Crowley told Mr. Bradford that he thought they (Bradfords) 
had had ample time to secure a loan commitment, but that they 
had not done so. As a result, Mr. Crowley stated that "infla-
tion had taken the house way past and beyond the point of 
that contract." He further stated that, "I just economicallz 
could not afford to do it as a gratis program and with nothing 
that I was legally bound to. 11 (Emphasis added.) (R. 507) 
Respondents Alveys had conveyed the entire subdivision 
in which the subject lot and home is located to Respondent 
Crowley on or about April 2, 1979. (Exhibit 11, 12) The 
Ernest Money Receipt, Exhibit 11, includes subject Lot 95 
and provides on lines 21-24, "Buyer (Crowley) to assume 
Sellers (Alveys') position in all of the following ... 
(2) Sellers obligation for completion of improvements approxi-
rnately $104,000.00. (3) assume Sellers equity and mortgage 
obligation on the following homes presently under construction 
... 95* ... (*indicated the home is pre-sold)." (Emphasis 
added.) (Exhibit 11) 
-8-
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On April 30, 1979, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford filed the 
Complaint initiating this action. (R. 2) Subsequently, in 
July, 1979, Mason-McDuffie gave Mr. and Mrs. Bradford a firm 
con:unitment for a $40,000.00 loan. (R. 345, 346, 389) Tender 
of the full purchase price as per the original agreement, 
Exhibit 1, was made on July 30, 1979. (R. 390, Exhibit 10) 
In May of 1979, Mr. Bradford received $17,000.00 from 
his parents. This was not listed as an obligation on the 
subsequent loan application to Mason-McDuffie as there was 
no firm obligation to repay these monies. (R. 388) The 
monies would be paid back 11 if and when" Mr. and Mrs. Bradford 
were able. (R. 444) 
The matter was tried to the Court on the 24th and 25th 
days of September, 1979, the Honorable Dean E. Conder presiding. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MR. AND 
MRS. BRADFORD FAILED TO USE REASONABLE DILIGENCE 
IN OBTAINING FINANCING. 
This being an action in equity, this Court reviews the 
complete record, both law and facts, and passes upon the 
weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Reimain v. Baum, 
115 Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949); Coombs v. Ouzounian, 
24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P. 2d 356 (1970). 
The evidence set forth in the record is contrary to 
Findings of Fact numbered 5, as amended, 10 and 11; Conclu-
sions of Law numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9; and the 
-9-
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judgment of the court below; and clearly preponderates 
against the Respondents. 
It is not contested that where an agreement for the 
sale of real property is expressly made subject to the buyer 
obtaining financing that the prospective buyer has an implied 
duty to use "reasonable diligence" in seeking financing. 
Sorenson v. Connelly, 536 P.2d 328 (Colo. App. 1975); Anaheim 
Company v. Holcombe, 246 Ore. 541, 426 P.2d 743 (1967). 
Inasmuch as all Appellants Bradfords' objections to the 
lower court's findings, conclusions and judgment, except the 
objection to Finding No. 5, are based upon the issue of 
"reasonable diligence," this will first be discussed. Follow-
ing this, the error in the lower court's Finding No. 5 regard-
ing Mr. and Mrs Bradford's alleged failure to make full dis-
closure of debts in their loan application will be set forth. 
To determine what is "reasonable diligence," all the 
"facts and circumstances" of the case must be considered. 
Commercial Security Bank v. Johnson, 110 Utah 342, 173 P.2d 
277 (1946); Matlock v. Wheeler, 306 P.2d 325 (Okla. 1957); 
Aspinwall v. Ryan, 190 Ore. 530, 226 P.2d 814 (1951); 
Campbell v. Warnberg, 133 Kan. 246, 299 P. 583 (1931). 
In Commercial Security Bank, supra, at p. 281, the 
Court provides that a~ agreement which fails to set forth a 
time for performance must, by implication, be performed within 
a "reasonable" time. In determining what was reasonable, the 
court set forth the question, "Considering all the facts and 
-10-
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circumstances of this case, was . sufficient time for a 
reasonably prudent and diligent man . . . [to perform the] 
contract? 11 (Emphasis added). 
This provides us with the determinative test in this 
case: whether, under the facts and circumstance of this case, 
Mr. and Mrs. Bradford's efforts to obtain financing were 
reasonable. 
It is uncontradicted that no formal loan application 
was made by Mr. and Mrs. Bradford until approximately 13 
months had elapsed from the date of the execution of the 
subject Earnest Money contract, Exhibit 1. (Earnest Money 
dated February 22, 1978; Mr. and Mrs. Bradford applied with 
Mason-McDuffie sometime in the first part of March, 1979.) 
(R. 345, 388, Exhibit 1) The Arizona court under similar 
circumstances, in considering the related issue of abandonment, 
stated that the mere lapse of time was not sufficient to con-
stitute an abandonment. Glad Tidings Church v. Hinkley, 
71 Ariz. 307, 226 P.2d 1016 (1951). Similarly here, the 
passage of time, though relevant, is not determinative . 
.More importantly, the facts must be closely analyzed 
to determine why Mr. and Mrs. Bradford waited to make the 
formal loan application. 
Why? Because Barney Alvey was the construction foreman 
for Respondents Alveys (R. 376, 450, 451); because Barney 
Alvey either by telephone or in person had discussions with 
Mr. and/or Mrs. Bradford approximately every five or six 
-11-
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weeks during this entire time regarding the completion of 
the home (R. 376-78 I 437 I 438 I 383' 384 I 439 I 440 I 451); 
because Barney Alvey told Mr. and Mrs. Bradford in February, 
1978 that the home would be finished in July or August, 1978 
(R. 376, 381, 437); because Barney Alvey told them completion 
would be delayed because of a problem Alveys were having in 
obtaining the brick, this happening first in May, then July, 
and again in September, all in 1978 (R. 384-386, 440); 
because Mr. and Mrs. Bradford met with Pam Tazzer and Barney 
Alvey in March, 1978 to choose the tile, tile colors, appli-
ance colors and other items for the home (R. 383, 451); 
because Pam Tazzer told them in July, 1978 that there was a 
problem with the brick and it would not be available until 
September, 1978 (R. 439, 440); because in November, 1978, 
Mrs. Bradford met with Pam Tazzer in Respondents Alveys' 
offices and picked out the stone work for the house (R. 440); 
because in December, 1978, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford were contacted 
by Respondents Alveys' office and told where to pick out their 
cabinets (which they did, paying $52 .·oo above the allowance) 
(R. 392, Exhibit 8); because in December, 1978, Mr. and Mrs. 
Bradford paid for purchase and installation for extra counter-
top material for the house (R. 392, 417; Exhibit 9); because 
in January, 1979, Barney Alvey told Mr. Bradford that the 
subject Shiloh home would be finished in approximately two 
months, and that they should get their existing home sold 
(R. 441); because in February, 1979, Barney Alvey told Mrs. 
-12-
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Bradford that their home, the subject house, was next on 
line to be completed (R. 386); because about the first of 
March, 1979, Mr. and Mrs. Bradford, in reliance on Barney 
Alvey's statements, sold the home they then owned and were 
living in (R. 386); because about the first of March, 1979, 
Mr. Bradford told Barney Alvey that they had sold their home, 
and Barney Alvey stated he believed their new home could be 
finished in 30 days (R. 386); because their only contacts 
with Respondents Alveys were through Barney Alvey and Pam 
Tazzer, and no one for or on behalf of said Respondents ever 
inquired or demanded from Mr. or Mrs. Bradford as to the status 
of the financing nor the payment of any monies (R. 483) ; and 
because the first indication of any sort which Bradfords re-
( 
ceived that the Respondencts were not going to honor the sale 
agreement came from Respondent Crowley on or about April, 
1979 (R. 442). 
[In addition to the above, were the statements of 
Michael Herzog to the Bradfords to the effect that the formal 
loan application need not be made until the house was near 
completion (R. 194-198) That testimony of these statements 
was erroneously excluded by the lower court is more particu-
larly set forth under Point II below.] 
Under these facts, was it reasonable for Mr. and Mrs. 
Bradford to postpone making their formal loan application 
until March, 1979? Certainly. Respondents Alveys by their 
actions induced Mr. and Mrs. Bradford into believing throughout 
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the entire period in question that they (Alveys) were still 
honoring the subject sale agreement, Exhibit 1. Any reasonable 
buyer in the place of Mr. and Mrs. Bradford would have acted 
as they did. They wanted the home very much. Therefore, 
instead of walking away when the home was not completed as 
originally anticipated, they continued to work with the sellers, 
expecting to close the sale at some later date. They saw no 
need to prematurely seek financing when they were unsure as 
to when the home would be completed. As soon as they were 
told the new home was near completion, they not only made a 
formal loan application, but sold their existing home. They 
were obviously proceeding reasonably and in good faith. 
Why did Respondents repudiate the agreement? In the 
words of Respondent Crowley, "I just could not economically 
afford to do it .... " (R. 507) Unquestionably, prices had 
increased in the one-year period since the agreement was first 
executed. Crowley, however, took the subdivision with actual 
knowledge that Lot 95 had been "presold." (Exhibit 11) He 
stepped into the shoes of Respondents Alveys. He should have 
more thoroughly examined his potential liability with respect 
to the presold lots. 
Mr. and Mrs. Bradford's conduct throughout has been 
reasonable and prudent. They should not be made to suffer 
for Respondents' error in judgment. 
To allow Respondents to back away from this agreement, 
Exhibit 1, at this point would result in a manifest injustice 
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to Mr. and Mrs. Bradford. They can be made whole only by 
this Court exercising its equitable duty and ordering the 
Respondents to specifically perform pursuant to the original 
agreement. The judgment of the lower court should be reversed. 
Finally, in awarding specific performance, the Court 
should be aware that: 
1. Tender of payment by Mr. and Mrs. Bradford was 
unnecessary. Although tender of performance is normally 
required, a party is relieved of this duty where the other 
party repudiates the underlying agreement. Schmidt v. Sapp, 
71 Ariz. 48, 223 P.2d 403 (1950); Flagg v. Fisk, 87 N.Y.S. 
530 (1904). Also, it is so elementary as to require no cita-
tion that neither law nor equity requires one to do a vain 
or futile act. Obviously, tender after repudiation would 
have been and in fact was futile; and 
2. Mr. and Mrs. Bradford appear before the Court with 
"clean hands." Respondents have consistently attempted to 
paint the Bradfords with unclean hands on the basis that in 
obtaining their loan commitment in July, 1979, Bradfords did 
not disclose that they had received $17,000.00 from Mr. 
Bradford's parents in May of 1979. This is immaterial for 
two reasons: (a) Although Mr. Feil effectively led Mr. 
Bradford in deposition into stating that he had to repay the 
money, this was subsequently clarified in trial. Hr. and 
Mrs. Bradford testified that they are not under any obligation 
to repay his parents, but are repaying them on an "if and 
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when able" basis. (R. 444) His parents do not expect re-
payment. (R. 424) Mr. Calder of Mason-McDuffie testified 
that this money would have no effect on the loan if the 
applicants were not required to repay it. (R. 347 I 348); 
and (b) as previously set forth, no tender was necessary as 
Respondents had repudiated the agreement. The July 30, 1979 
tender was, therefore, superfluous. 
Under the circumstances of this case, Mr. and Mrs. 
Bradford preceeded with reasonable diligence. They should 
be awarded specific performance and the matter remanded for 
hearing on costs and attorney's fees. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW TESTIMONY BY MR. AND MRS. 
BRADFORD OF CONVERSATIONS THEY HAD WITH REAL 
ESTATE AGEUT .MICHAEL HERZOG. 
On direct examination, after testifying that he and 
Mrs. Bradford had obtained Midvalley's telephone number from 
a sign in Shiloh subdivision, and that in response to a call, 
Michael Herzog had come to their house and they had signed 
the Earnest Money, Exhibit 1, Mr. Bradford was asked: 
Q. Were the terms of that earnest money receipt 
discussed at that time with Mr. Herzog? 
A. Yes. It was. 
Q. And referring to line 21 of that agreement, 
will you read that? 
A. Says subject to buyer obtaining financing, FHA. 
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Q. How did that come to be placed in the agree-
ment? 
A. Mike Herzog told us that .... (R. 372-373) 
At that point, Mr. Poulton, counsel for Respondent 
Crowley, objected on the basis of hearsay. Mr. Feil, counsel 
for Respondents Alveys, joined in the objection on the same 
grounds. The lower court at first overruled the objection 
with respect to Respondents Alveys as the judge apparently 
had mistakenly heard that Mr. Herzog was the real estate agent 
for "Alvey Investment" rather than for "Midvalley Investment." 
(R. 373, lines 8-29) Upon being advised that Herzog was the 
real estate agent for Midvalley rather than directly for 
Alveys, the court reversed itself. (R. 374) 
The court then expressly denied counsel's contention 
that Herzog was also the agent for Alveys. (R. 374). 
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Bradford testified that Mr. 
Herzog took him and Mrs. Bradford to American Home Mortgage 
for a pre-qualification meeting with one of the loan officers. 
Mr. Bradford was asked: 
Q. Did you ever get a loan commitment from 
American Home Mortgage? 
A. No. We did not. 
Q. Why not? 
A. We were told at the pre-qualification . . . . 
At this point, both Mr. Feil and Mr. Poulton objected 
on the ground of hearsay. The objection was sustained. (R. 375) 
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It was prejudicial error for the court to sustain these 
objections. 
A. Michael Herzog was the agent for Respondents Alvevs 
for the purposes of this transaction. 
Respondents Alveys were ~he sellers of the subject pro-
perty. They enlisted Midvalley Investment to market the 
Shiloh subdivision. The offices of Midvalley and of Respon-
dents Alveys were located in the same building. (R. 382) 
Respondent Michael Alvey was the vice president and treasurer 
of Midvalley. Respondent Vaughn Alvey was the president and 
secretary of Midvalley. (R. 450) Michael Herzog was the 
real estate agent for Midvalley who came to Mr. and Mrs. 
Bradford's home to discuss their purchasing a home in the 
Shiloh subdivision. (R. 372) Respondents Alveys instructed 
the real estate agents that brought in sale contracts to go 
and aid the buyers in getting financing. (R. 476) 
In fact, Respondent Michael Alvey testified: 
Q. You never called the Bradfords and asked them 
or told them they had any amount of time to obtain 
financing did you, yes or no? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
(R. 493) 
Not directly. 
Did anyone from Alvey Costruction, Yes or no? 
Mike Herzog was told to. (Emphasis added.) 
The general rule is well established that the realtor 
is the agent for the seller. Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 
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329 P.2d 410 (1958) i Giese v. Tarp, 92 Idaho 243, 440 P.2d 
521 (1968) i Bartsas Realty, Inc. v. Leverton, 82 Nev. 6 ' 
409 p. 2d 627 (1966) i Alexander Myers & Co. , Inc. v. Hopke, 
88 Wash. 2d 449, 565 p. 2d 80 (1977) i Henderson v. Johnson, 
66 Wash. 2d 511, 403 p. 2d 669 (1965); Zwick v. United Farm 
Agency, Inc., 556 P.2d 508 (Wyo. 1976). 
The seller in this case was the Respondents Alveys. 
They retained their broker-agency, Midvalley Investment, to 
market the subject property. Michael Herzog of Midvalley 
discussed with Mr. and Mrs. Bradford on several occasions the 
financing and completion of their home on Lot 95. (See the 
Affidavits of Michael Herzog, R. 194-196, and of Mr. Bradford, 
R. 197 I 198). 
It is significant to remember that the only contacts 
Mr. and Mrs. Bradford had with the Respondents Alveys were 
through Barney Alvey, Pam Tazzer and Michael Herzog. During 
the entire period in question, neither of Respondents Alveys 
had any personal contact with either Mr. or Mrs. Bradford. 
The original agreement, Exhibit 1, was made and entered into 
with the realtor,.Michael Herzog, on behalf of Respondents 
Alveys, negotiating it in its entirety. Respondent Michael 
Alvey testified that Mike Hergoz was told to discuss the fin-
ancing with the Bradfords. (R. 493) Clearly, Herzog was 
acting as the agent for Respondents Alveys. 
But Michael Herzog is also Respondents Alveys agent 
by application of the doctrine of "agency by estoppel." 
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Such an agency may be created in so far as third persons 
are concerned from acts and appearances which lead third per-
sons to believe the agency has been created. Taylor v. 
United States Casualty Company, 229 S.C. 230, 925 E.2d 647 
(1956). 
The relevant facts set forth under the statement of 
facts are clear and uncontradicted. The offices of Midvalley 
Investment and of Respondents Alveys were located in the same 
building. The Respondents Alveys were the president/secretary 
and vice president/treasurer of Midvalley. None of Respondents 
Alveys ever personally made any contact with either Mr. or 
Mrs. Bradford. All negotiations and discussions on the agree-
ment, Exhibit 1, were made through Michael Herzog. Such facts 
are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that an 
agency relationship existed. Respondents Alveys should be 
estopped to deny this. 
B. The statements made by Michael Herzog to Mr. 
and Mrs. Bradford, which were excluded at trial, do not 
constitute hearsay. 
"Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a 
witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the 
truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence " Rule 
63, Utah Rules of Evidence. (Emphasis added.) 
As per the Affidavits of Michael Herzog and Mr. Bradford 
(R. 194-198), Herzog told Mr. and Mrs. Bradford that it would 
not be necessary for them to seek financing until the home was 
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nearly completed. This does not go to the truthfulness of 
\ 
that statement. It is relevant because it was stated and it 
goes to the reasonableness of Mr. and Mrs. bradford's conduct 
under the facts and circumstances of this case. It goes to 
the state of mind of the Bradfords and as circumstantial 
evidence of such is an exclusion rather than exception from 
the hearsay rule. See 6 Wigmore, Evidence §1789 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1976). 
C. Even if the excluded testimony was construed to 
be hearsay, it is admissible under either of two exceptions 
thereto. 
1. Rule 63(8) (a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
provides that an exception to the hearsay rule is "a state-
ment by a person authorized by the party to make a statement 
or statements for him concerning the subject of the statement." 
Significant and determinative here is the fact that Respondents 
Alveys had no personal contact with either Mr. or Mrs. 
Bradford. The entire negotiations took place between Bradfords 
and Herzog, Herzog acting as the representative of Respondents 
Alveys. Herzog was told to discuss financing arrangements 
with the Bradfords. Clearly, Herzog was the agent of Alveys 
and was authorized to complete the negotiations on this sale. 
As such, his statements are authorized admissions and are 
admissible, particularly ~hose regarding financing. 
2. Even if this were not so, Herzog's statements would 
still be admissible as vicarious admissions under Rule 63(9) (a) 
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of the Utah Rules of Evidence. This in effect provides that 
(1) if the judge finds the declarant unavailable as a witness, 
(2) the statement concerns a matter within the scope of an 
agency or employment of the declarant for a party, (3) the 
statement was made before termination of the agency or em-
ployment, then (4) his statements will be admissible against 
the party for whom he was the agent or employee. 
Although no evidence was introduced at trial to show 
the unavailability of Herzog, attempts were made to have him 
subpoenaed. The process server was unable to locate him. 
More importantly, a showing of unavailability was not 
necessary in this case. The lower court made a definitive 
ruling that Herzog was not the agent of Respondents Alveys. 
(R. 374) Thus, an essential element under Rule 63(9) (a), 
that the declarant be an agent or employee of a party, was 
found to be missing. It would have been a vain and futile 
act to show that the declarant was unavailable as the court 
had already found, though based upon an erroneous holding, 
that this exception was inapplicable. 
The other elements under Rule 63(9()a) are clearly 
met. Herzog's statements pertained to the obtaining of 
financing for the closing of the subject agreement. This was 
clearly within his agency as he alone had negotiated the 
agreement with the Bradfords on behalf of Alveys and had 
been expressly told by Michael Alvey to discuss financing 
with the Bradfords. Also, the statements were made during 
the period Herzog was employed with Midvalley, agent for Alveys. 
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D. Proffer of evidence was unnecessary in this 
instance. 
It is conceded that generally the exclusion of evi-
dence in the trial of a case will not be reviewed on appeal 
unless a proper offer is made at the trial level. Downey 
State Bank v. Major Blackney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978). 
However, "offers of proof need not be made in all casses, 
and will not control in all cases when made." In re Young's 
Estate, 33 Utah 382, 94 P. 731 (1908). An offer of proof is 
unnecessary where the nature of the error is otherwise clear. 
Grecor Manolakos, 24 Ariz. 490, 539 P.2d 964 (1975); Gregg v. 
Gregg, 469 P.2d 406 (Wyo. 1970) Taylor v. McDonald, 409 P.2d 
7 6 2 (Wyo . 19 6 6 ) . 
For Herzog's statements to be admissible under either 
of the exceptions set forth above, Rule 63(8) (a) or 63(9) (a), 
the court must find that Herzog was Respondents Alveys' agent. 
Again, the court expressly found otherwise. That this was 
error is clear from the record as has been discussed under part 
A above. 
The court in effect held inadmissible any evidence 
which required a finding of an agency relationship between 
Herzog and Alveys. In such cases, where an entire class or 
type of evidence is excluded, an offer of proof is not a pre-
requisite for arguing the prejudicial nature of the exclusion 
on appeal. Costa v. Regents of University of California, 116 
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C.A. 2d 445, 254 P.2d 85 (1953); Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 
2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944). An offer under these circum-
stances would be an idle gesture. Therefore, no proffer was 
required. 
E. The error in excluding this testimony was substan-
tial and prejudicial. 
As stated by this Court in Arnovitz v. Tella, 495 P.2d 
310 (Utah 1972), an error is substantial and prejudicial if 
"there would be a reasonable likelihood of a different result 
in the absence of such error.'' Clearly, if Mr. and Mrs. 
Bradford had been allowed to testify that they had been told 
by Herzog that they need not seek financing until the home 
was nearly completed, this would be a substantial factor in 
analyzing the reasonableness of their conduct. In all likeli-
hood, this would have resulted in a different result in the 
lower court. 
This Court should reverse the lower court on the admis-
sibility of Herzog's statements to Bradfords and consequently 
reverse the holding of that court. Or, in the very least, 
should remand this matter to the lower court for the taking 
of additional evidence on the statements made by Mr. Herzog 
to Mr. and Mrs. Bradford, as set forth in the Affidavits. 
(R. 194-198) 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PLEADINGS 
Subsequent to trial and to the issuance by the court 
of its decision, counsel for Mr. and ~trs. Bradford filed a 
Motion for New Trial, To Alter and Amend Judgment and For 
Leave to Amend Pleadings to Confirm to the Evidence. (R. 173) 
Along with this was filed an Amended Complaint which set 
forth in a new Count Five the theory of equitable estoppel. 
(R. 175, 178). 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, 
in part, "When issues not raised by pleadings are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings." In such cases, the court has no discretion 
whether or not to allow the proposed amendment but must do 
so. General Insurance Company v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 
545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976) 
When is an issue tried by implied consent? Where evi-
dence on that issue is introduced without objection. In 
General Insurance Company v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., supra., 
evidence concerning the circumstances of appellants executing 
an indemnity agreement was introduced. No objection was made 
to this. Appellant's counsel moved to amend their answer to 
plead lack of consideration on the ground that it was neces-
sary to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. This 
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was denied by the trial court on the ground that lack of con-
sideration was an affirmative defense of which the plaintiff-
respondent had no notice. On appeal, this Court overruled 
the lower court by stating, "In the instant action, the evi-
dence upon which Butchers (appellants) based their Motion to 
Amend was introduced without objection, and thus, the issue 
of consideration was tried by implied consent." 
This Court also held in Wells v. Wells, 2 Utah 2d 241, 
272 P.2d 167 (1954) at p. 170, that an amendment will be 
allowed so long as "a change is not made in the liability 
subject to be enforced against the defendant." 
In the instant case, no additional evidence is required 
to establish an estoppel. Furthermore, allowing an amendment 
to set forth estoppel in no way changes the liability sought 
to be enforced against the Respondents. 
Equitable estoppel arises when a party by its actions 
or representations or otherwise induces another to believe 
certain facts to exist, and that such other, acting with 
reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and acts thereon 
so that he will suffer injustice if the former is permitted 
to deny the existence of such facts. Kelly v. Richards, 
95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731 (1938); Morgan v. Board of State 
Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976) 
Respondents Alveys, through Barney Alvey, Pam Tazzer 
and Michael Herzog, continually represented to the Appellants 
facts and circumstances regarding the construction of the 
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home on the subject property. In January of 1979, Barney 
Alvey expressly told the Appellants to sell their existing 
home and get thei~ financing ready to go for the Shiloh, 
subject matter, home. Appellants' contacts and conversations 
with these persons continued through March of 1979. The only 
reasonable implication from the conduct of said persons, 
agents of the Respondents, is that the subject Earnest Money 
Receipt and Of fer to Purchase was still being accepted by them 
as valid and binding. Respondents should have reasonably 
known that the Appellants would rely on these contacts and 
communications in this matter. Appellants did reasonably 
rely on these representations. At no time were they given 
notice or any impression but that the Alveys continued to 
accept the said Earnest Money Receipt as being valid and bind-
ing. Respondents should not now be allowed to deny the exis-
tence of the validity of this agreement. To do so, would 
certainly result in injustice to the Appellants. 
Again, the liberal amendment policies of the courts 
should have been exercised to allow amendment of the Complaint 
to set forth the claim of equitable estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court is contrary to the 
facts of this case as set forth in the record. Further, 
it was prejudicial error to exclude testimony of conversa-
tions between Mr. Bradford and Michael Herzog. The lower 
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court also erred in denying Appellants Bradfords' Motion to 
Amend Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence. The judgment 
should be reversed and Respondents ordered to perform pur-
suant to the terms of the agreement, Exhibit 1. 
Costs and attorney's fees ·should then be assessed 
against the Respondents pursuant to the terms of Exhibit 1. 
The matter should be remanded to the lower court for a deter-
mination of these amounts. 
In the alternative, the case should be remanded to 
allow for the testimony of statements made to Mr. Bradford 
by Michael Herzog to be presented and considered, and for a 
finding to be made on the issue of equitable estoppel. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 28th day of .March, 1980. 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
Gr nt A. Hurst 
orney for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
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